Philosophy 66 (255):5-23 (1991)

Abstract
Does it follow from Wittgenstein's views about indeterminism that irregularities of nature could take place? Did he believe that chairs could simply disappear and reappear, that water could behave differently than it has, and that a man throwing a fair die might throw ones for a week? Or are these things only imaginable? Is his view simply that if we adopted an indeterministic point of view we would no longer look for causes, or would not always look for causes, because we would no longer assume that there must be a cause of each event?
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819100052815
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