Abstract

This paper investigates the analysis of the de re/de dicto distinction and related facts. I start with the assumption, supported by Cresswell 1990, that the evaluation of the truth of a proposition relative to a particular possible world/situation is mediated via the presence in the syntax of a silent pronoun with type-s denotation. In this system, the de re/de dicto distinction arises from a difference in which an operator binds a given situation pronoun. Percus 2000 shows that such a system potentially overgenerates, in that a third type of reading is predicted to exist for sentences which actually have only two: de re and de dicto. Percus proposes constraints on the binding of situation pronouns, which correctly rule out these third readings. This paper shows, however, that extrinsic constraints on the binding of situation pronouns are not necessary to rule out the unwanted readings, as long as we develop a more precise theory of binding in the first place. I adapt the binding operator argued for by Büring 2004, originally developed only for overt pronouns, and show that when used as an operator for situation pronouns, the unwanted readings are not predicted to occur