Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):521-536 (2019)

Authors
S. Andrew Schroeder
Claremont McKenna College
Abstract
Many economic measures are structured to reflect ethical values. I describe three attitudes towards this: maximalism, according to which we should aim to build all relevant values into measures; minimalism, according to which we should aim to keep values out of measures; and an intermediate view. I argue the intermediate view is likely correct, but existing versions are inadequate. In particular, economists have strong reason to structure measures to reflect fixed, as opposed to user-assessable, values. This implies that, despite disagreement about precisely how to do so, economists should standardly adjust QALYs and DALYs to reflect egalitarian values.
Keywords QALY  measures of inequality  values in economic measures  health economics  values in science
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DOI 10.1017/s0266267118000317
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References found in this work BETA

Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather E. Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Inequality Reexamined.John Roemer & Amartya Sen - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):554.
Inequality.Larry S. Temkin - 1986 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (2):99-121.
Consequentializing and its Consequences.S. Schroeder - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1475-1497.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Tapestry of Values: Response to My Critics.Kevin C. Elliott - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (11).
Democratic Values: A Better Foundation for Public Trust in Science.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz023.
Consistency is Not Overrated.Carl Tollef Solberg, Ole Frithjof Norheim & Mathias Barra - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (12):830-831.

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