Law and Philosophy 28 (3):233 - 260 (2009)

Stefan Sciaraffa
McMaster University
Argues that content-independent reasons are intentions. Relies on Grice's distinction between natural and non-natural meaning. Rejects previous accounts, and argues that his account can understand the force of such reasons appropriately, through the conept of enabling-conditions. Illustrates through several paridigmatic types of content-independent reasons.
Keywords Philosophy   Political Science   Law Theory/Law Philosophy   Philosophy of Law
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DOI 10.1007/s10982-008-9037-7
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Legal Obligation and Reasons.Christopher Essert - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (1):63-88.
The Authority of Professional Roles.Andreas Eriksen - 2015 - Journal of Social Philosophy 46 (3):373-391.

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