Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642 (1990)
Authors
John R. Searle
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
Cognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point is that intrinsic intentionality has aspectual shape: Our mental representations represent the world under specific aspects, and these aspectual features are essential to a mental state's being the state that it is
Keywords Cognitive  Consciousness  Psychology
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X00029587
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
The Psychology of Folk Psychology.A. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.

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