Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):332-344 (1991)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
The dispute between the empiricist and interpretivist conceptions of the social sciences is properly conceived not as a matter of reduction or covering laws. Features specific to the social sciences include the following. Explanations of human behavior make reference to intentional causation; social phenomena are permeated with mental components and are self-referential; social science explanations have not been as successful as those in natural science because of their concern with intentional causation, because their explanations must be identical with the propositional content of the mind of the actor, and because a social phenomenon exists only if people believe it exists. Elements of an apparatus necessary to analyze this problematic social ontology are given and include selfreferentiality, constitutive rules, collective intentionality, linguistic permeation of the facts, systematic interrelationships among social facts, and primacy of acts over objects.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1177/004839319102100303 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Philosophy and the Human Sciences.Charles Taylor - 1985 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
View all 6 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
The Psychology of Folk Psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
Knowledge of the Psychological States of Self and Others is Not Only Theory-Laden but Also Data-Driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.
There's More to Mental States Than Meets the Inner “L”.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):34-35.
View all 75 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Redescription and Descriptivism in the Social Sciences.Lee C. McIntyre - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):453 - 464.
Methodological Individualism and Vertical Integration in the Social Sciences.Anthony Walsh - 1997 - Behavior and Philosophy 25 (2):121 - 136.
Symposium on Explanations and Social Ontology 3: Can We Dispense with Structural Explanations of Social Facts?Erik Weber & Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):259-275.
Mind, Society, and the Growth of Knowledge.Paul Thagard - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):629-645.
Evolutionary Psychology, Adaptation and Design.Stephen M. Downes - 2014 - In P. Huneman & M. Silberstein (eds.), Handbook of Evolutionary Thinking in the Sciences. Springer. pp. 659-673.
Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Social Sciences: Reply to Ingram and Meehan. [REVIEW]James Bohman - 1997 - Human Studies 20 (4):441-458.
Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
Evolutionary Social Science Beyond Culture.Harold Kincaid - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):356-356.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
100 ( #115,655 of 2,499,690 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #118,216 of 2,499,690 )
2009-01-28
Total views
100 ( #115,655 of 2,499,690 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #118,216 of 2,499,690 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads