Materialism and the Foundations of Representation

Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada) (1981)
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Abstract

This thesis divides into two main sections. The first is an attempt to show that the Psycho-physical Identity Theory is false, and is so even if we grant that human behaviour is in principle completely explicable in purely physical terms . This section is a sustained criticism of a staight-forward argument in favour of the Identity Theory, namely: Mental items cause behaviour. All behaviour is caused by physical items. So mental items are physical items. ;This section is also divisible into two main parts, both of which present arugments against the Identity Theory. ;The first argument presented is originally from Davidson's paper "Mental Events" . The claim I am interested in is that no systematic correlations can be found between mental and physical events. I explicate and defend this claim which is based, roughly, on the contrast between the conditions of ascription of mental states such as belief and physical states. The former are ascribed so as to form a system within which behaviour appears rational, the latter are not. Since certain forms of the identity theory demand such correlations they are undercut by Davidson's claim. ;The second argument presented is that the Identity Theory fails because of the content of our concepts of the mental. The problem here is that of identifying entities from different theories for I take our common sense mentalistic explanations to be part of a theory. If both theories say a lot about what sort of thing the entities they mention are identification across the theories will be impossible, even if the entities in question are thought to play similar causal roles. For example, the content of "phlogiston theory" and "oxygen theory" is sufficient to preclude identifying phlogiston and oxygen despite the basically similar role they are supposed to play. I bring forth several features of our mentalistic explanations in an attempt to show the extensiveness of the content of our mentalistic theory. ;The failure of the Identity Theory does not imply the failure of Materialism, for one can still espouse an "eliminative" form of Materialism. This doctrine has appeared implausible, though, because of the seemingly direct or immediate awareness we have of at least some mental items. I believe this appearance can be removed only by developing a materialistically acceptable theory of behaviour in which the phenomena of direct awareness can be explained. ;The second half of the thesis is thus devoted to outlining such a theory. The central notion deployed is that of an "internal representation" of the world which guides behaviour. The representational nature of internal states arises solely from their place in the logical structure of these states and their role in the production of behaviour. Beginning with extremely simple behaviour I investigate the additional capabilities which the representational system must have to explain such activities as perception, goal seeking, the representation of causal and/or logical sequences, and the representation of the entity's own abilities to alter the world around it. ;The basic theory of internal representation is then applied to the problem of introspection and direct awareness. I argue that any complex conceptualization of aspects of the world demands a representational medium in which to be carried out. Our so-called direct awareness is in fact the application of a complicated representational schema. As such it is in essence no more priveleged than any other schema which could be applied to these phenomena. Thus our direct awareness cannot be taken as an infallible guide to the nature or existence of the phenomenal qualities of mental states, and this in turn leaves the door open for some sort of eliminative materialism.

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William Seager
University of Toronto at Scarborough

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