Minds, brains and programs

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57 (1980)
Abstract
What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. But according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to.
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Brain  Mind  Program
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X00005756
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References found in this work BETA
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Collected Essays.Thomas Henry Huxley - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
The Self‐Evidencing Brain.Jakob Hohwy - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):259-285.

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