Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2022)
Abstract1 Non-reductive physicalists deny that there is any explanation of mentality in purely physical terms, but do not deny that the mental is entirely determined by and constituted out of underlying physical structures. There are important issues about the stability of such a view which teeters on the edge of explanatory reductionism on the one side and dualism on the other (see Kim 1998). 2 Save perhaps for eliminative materialism (see Churchland 1981 for a classic exposition). In fact, however, while.
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Citations of this work
Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem.David Chalmers - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. New York: Routledge. pp. 353-373.
Priority Cosmopsychism and the Advaita Vedānta.Luca Gasparri - 2019 - Philosophy East and West 69 (1):130-142.
Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap.Todd E. Feinberg & Jon Mallatt - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
Can the Russellian Monist Escape the Epiphenomenalist’s Paradox?Lok-Chi Chan - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1093-1102.
References found in this work
Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind–Body Problem and Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.