Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2022)
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1 Non-reductive physicalists deny that there is any explanation of mentality in purely physical terms, but do not deny that the mental is entirely determined by and constituted out of underlying physical structures. There are important issues about the stability of such a view which teeters on the edge of explanatory reductionism on the one side and dualism on the other (see Kim 1998). 2 Save perhaps for eliminative materialism (see Churchland 1981 for a classic exposition). In fact, however, while.



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Sean Allen-Hermanson
Florida International University
William Seager
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Philip Goff
Durham University