Panpsychism

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2022)
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Abstract

1 Non-reductive physicalists deny that there is any explanation of mentality in purely physical terms, but do not deny that the mental is entirely determined by and constituted out of underlying physical structures. There are important issues about the stability of such a view which teeters on the edge of explanatory reductionism on the one side and dualism on the other (see Kim 1998). 2 Save perhaps for eliminative materialism (see Churchland 1981 for a classic exposition). In fact, however, while.

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Author Profiles

Sean Allen-Hermanson
Florida International University
William Seager
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Philip Goff
Durham University

References found in this work

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.
Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.

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