Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (3):205-225 (1982)
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The purpose of this article is to explain how an account of proper names can be incorporated into a general account of the intentionality of mind and language. I show that such an account supports the so-Called descriptivist conception of proper names and in so doing I answer the objections of causal theorists
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How to Infer What Persistent Things Are Up to – a Fregean Puzzle for Traditional Fregeans.Johan Gersel - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-30.
Frege’s Puzzle and the Ex Ante Pareto Principle.Anna Mahtani - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2077-2100.
Imitation of Life: Structure, Agency and Discourse in Theatrical Performance.Kieran Cashell - 2012 - Journal of Critical Realism 11 (3):324-360.
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