Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202 (2004)

Authors
Sean Crawford
University of Manchester
Abstract
Abstract According to Russellianism, the content of a Russellian thought, in which a person ascribes a monadic property to an object, can be represented as an ordered couple of the object and the property. A consequence of this is that it is not possible for a person to believe that a is F and not to believe b is F, when a=b. Many critics of Russellianism suppose that this is possible and thus that Russellianism is false. Several arguments for this claim are criticized and it is argued that Russellians need not appeal to representational notions in order to defeat them. Contrary to popular opinion, the prospects for a pure Russellianism, a Russellianism without representations, are in fact very good
Keywords Russellianism  Millianism  belief puzzle  second-order belief
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DOI 10.1080/05568640409485140
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.

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