The intentionality of intention and action

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):253 – 280 (1979)
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This article presents a sketch of a theory of action. It does so by locating the relation of intention to action -vithin a general theory of Intentionality. It introduces a distinction between ptiorintentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally self-referential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they allow suggested solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the accordion effect, basic actions, etc.); the demonstration of striking similarities between the logical structure of intentional action and the logical structure of perception; and the construction of an account of simple actions. A successfully performed intentional action characteristically consists of an intention in action together with the bodily movement or state of the agent which is its condition of satisfaction and which is caused by it. The account is extended to complex actions.



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John R. Searle
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intrinsic intentionality.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):450-457.

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References found in this work

Freedom to act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Thought and action.Stuart Hampshire - 1959 - Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
What is an intentional state?John R. Searle - 1979 - Mind 88 (January):74-92.
Intentionality and the use of language.John R. Searle - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 181--197.

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