Why I am not a property dualist

Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):57-64 (2002)
Authors
John R. Searle
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
I have argued in a number of writings[1] that the philosophical part (though not the neurobiological part) of the traditional mind-body problem has a fairly simple and obvious solution: All of our mental phenomena are caused by lower level neuronal processes in the brain and are themselves realized in the brain as higher level, or system, features. The form of causation is
Keywords Behavior  Biology  Dualism  Metaphysics  Property
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Progress in Machine Consciousness.D. Gamez - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):887-910.

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