Can Knowledge Itself Justify Harmful Research?

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 29 (2):302-307 (2020)
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Abstract

In our paper, we argue for three necessary conditions for morally permissible animal research: (1) an assertion (or expectation) of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition. We argue that these conditions are necessary, without taking a position on whether they are jointly sufficient. In their excellent commentary on our paper, Matthias Eggel, Carolyn Neuhaus, and Herwig Grimm (hereafter, the authors) argue for a friendly amendment to one of our three conditions. In particular, they argue for replacing the first condition—expectation of sufficient net benefit (ESNB)—with an expectation of knowledge production (EKP). In this reply, we will explain why we are open to this proposed amendment, but not yet convinced.

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Author Profiles

Jeff Sebo
New York University
David DeGrazia
George Washington University

Citations of this work

Respect for Persons.Joseph Millum & Danielle Bromwich - 2020 - The Oxford Handbook of Research Ethics.

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