The main two arguments for probabilism are flawed

Synthese 191 (3):287-295 (2014)
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Abstract

Probabilism, the view that agents have numerical degrees of beliefs that conform to the axioms of probability, has been defended by the vast majority of its proponents by way of either of two arguments, the Dutch Book Argument and the Representation Theorems Argument. In this paper I argue that both arguments are flawed. The Dutch Book Argument is based on an unwarranted, ad hoc premise that cannot be dispensed with. The Representation Theorems Argument hinges on an invalid implication

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.

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