Minds: Contents without vehicles

Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):149-181 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper explores a new understanding of mind or mental representation by arguing that contents at the personal level are not carried by vehicles. Contentful mental states at the personal level are distinctive by virtue of their vehicle-less nature: the subpersonal physiological or functional states that are associated with and enable personal level contents cannot be understood as their vehicles, neither can the sensations or the sensory conditions associated with perceptual contents. This result is obtained by first extending the interpretationist ideas of Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett to show that subpersonal physiological or functional states cannot be construed as the vehicles of personal level contents. Then the anti-foundationalist arguments of Wilfrid Sellars are extended to show that sensory states cannot stand as vehicles to perceptual contents. The line of argumentation extended from Sellars also provides a critique of the current trend to posit non-conceptual contents



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,912

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Stability is not intrinsic.D. C. Dennett & C. F. Westbury - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):153-154.
Perceptual experience and its contents.Josefa Toribio - 2002 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (4):375-392.
How to Think About Nonconceptual Content.Walter Hopp - 2010 - The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10 (1):1-24.
Meaning and other non-biological categories.Josefa Toribio - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (2):129-150.
In defence of non-conceptual content.Simone Gozzano - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126.


Added to PP

182 (#76,808)

6 months
3 (#242,397)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sonia Sedivy
University of Toronto at Scarborough

Citations of this work

The delocalized mind. Judgements, vehicles, and persons.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):1-24.
Nonconceptual Epicycles.Sonia Sedivy - 2006 - European Review of Philosophy 6:33-66.
The thesis of nonconceptual content.Michael Tye - 2006 - European Review of Philosophy 6:7-30.
Explaining Reference: A Plea for Semantic Psychologism.Santiago Echeverri - 2014 - In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. University of Geneva. pp. 550-580.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations