Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):149-181 (2004)
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Abstract |
This paper explores a new understanding of mind or mental representation by arguing that contents at the personal level are not carried by vehicles. Contentful mental states at the personal level are distinctive by virtue of their vehicle-less nature: the subpersonal physiological or functional states that are associated with and enable personal level contents cannot be understood as their vehicles, neither can the sensations or the sensory conditions associated with perceptual contents. This result is obtained by first extending the interpretationist ideas of Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett to show that subpersonal physiological or functional states cannot be construed as the vehicles of personal level contents. Then the anti-foundationalist arguments of Wilfrid Sellars are extended to show that sensory states cannot stand as vehicles to perceptual contents. The line of argumentation extended from Sellars also provides a critique of the current trend to posit non-conceptual contents
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Keywords | Foundationalism Metaphysics Mind Physicalism Vehicle Donald Davidson Wilfrid Sellars Reduction Nonconceptual Content |
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DOI | 10.1080/0951508042000239020 |
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References found in this work BETA
Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work.Jerry Fodor & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1990 - Cognition 35 (2):183-205.
Functionalism and Anomalous Monism.John McDowell - 1985 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell.
View all 7 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
The Delocalized Mind. Judgements, Vehicles, and Persons.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):1-24.
Boundless Thought. The Case of Conceptual Mental Episodes.Pierre Steiner - 2012 - Manuscrito 35 (2):269-309.
Explaining Reference: A Plea for Semantic Psychologism.Santiago Echeverri - 2014 - In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. University of Geneva. pp. 550-580.
View all 7 citations / Add more citations
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