Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):837-855 (2015)

Authors
Max Seeger
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Abstract
In thought insertion, subjects experience thoughts which they claim not to be their own. What they claim, it is typically said, is that the thought is not theirs in the sense that they are not the agent or author of the thought. But what does it mean to be the agent or author of a thought? The most intuitive idea is that for a thought to be one's own means for the thought to causally originate within the subject. I defend this analysis against rivaling accounts and discuss several challenges that have not been recognized so far
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2014.942897
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Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

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