Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):237-244 (2010)

Authors
Max Seeger
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Abstract
Jonathan Weinberg (2007) has argued that we should not appeal to intuition as evidence because it cannot be externally corroborated. This paper argues for the normative claim that Weinberg’s demand for external corroboration is misguided. The idea is that Weinberg goes wrong in treating philosophical appeal to intuition analogous to the appeal to evidence in the sciences. Traditional practice is defended against Weinberg’s critique with the argument that some intuitions are true simply in virtue of being intuited by the majority of people. The argument proceeds by way of examining a paradigm case, Putnam’s Twin Earth.
Keywords experimental philosophy  intuition  twin earth
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DOI 10.1163/18756735-90000879
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