Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):237-244 (2010)
AbstractJonathan Weinberg (2007) has argued that we should not appeal to intuition as evidence because it cannot be externally corroborated. This paper argues for the normative claim that Weinberg’s demand for external corroboration is misguided. The idea is that Weinberg goes wrong in treating philosophical appeal to intuition analogous to the appeal to evidence in the sciences. Traditional practice is defended against Weinberg’s critique with the argument that some intuitions are true simply in virtue of being intuited by the majority of people. The argument proceeds by way of examining a paradigm case, Putnam’s Twin Earth.
Similar books and articles
Twin-Earth Externalism and Concept Possession.Derek Ball - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):457-472.
The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism.George Bealer - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
Moral Realism and Twin Earth.Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis & Angus Dawson - 1999 - Facta Philosophica 1 (1):135-165.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
The Critique From Experimental Philosophy: Can Philosophical Intuitions Be Externally Corroborated?Max Seeger - 2011 - XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie.
References found in this work
No references found.