Joint attention, collective knowledge, and the "we" perspective

Social Epistemology 21 (3):217 – 230 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper, I am concerned with the practical aspect of joint attention. In particular, I ask what enables us to engage in joint activities, and go on to suggest that on a representational account of joint attention, this question cannot be satisfactorily answered. I explore John Campbell's "relational" approach and suggest that if one couples it with Peter Hobson's notion of "feeling perception", one may be in a position to account for the action-enabling aspect of joint engagements. This approach can usefully be thought of as describing a practical kind of collective knowledge.
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DOI 10.1080/02691720701673959
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References found in this work BETA
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Harvard University Press.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press.
Meaning.Stephen R. Schiffer - 1972 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action.Axel Seemann - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (5):637-655.

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