Plato's Phaedo on Disagreement and Its Role in Epistemic Improvement

Ancient Philosophy Today 2 (1):24-44 (2020)

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Abstract
Recent studies suggest that the form and style of Plato's dialogues have significant associations with their philosophical contents. Few scholars, however, have focused on the role of disagreements in epistemic improvement within the context of Plato's Phaedo. This paper seeks to unearth a ‘theory of disagreement’ underpinning the Phaedo by examining the conversation between Socrates and his interlocutors. In doing so, I will highlight the epistemic importance of recognizing disagreements. It is shown that there is a positive relationship between the correct method of philosophical argument and epistemic modesty, which plays a crucial role in solving disagreements and facilitating epistemic improvement.
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DOI 10.3366/anph.2020.0023
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Plato: Phaedo.Gail Fine & David Gallop - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (1):101.
Plato's Conception of Persuasion.Glenn R. Morrow - 1953 - Philosophical Review 62 (2):234-250.

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