In what follows I try to show that Spinoza modelled his project of rational psychology, in some of its major respects, upon Descartes's metaphysics of matter. I argue further that, like Descartes, who paid for the rationalization of the science of matter the price of having to leave out of his description non-quantifiable qualities, so Spinoza left out of his psychology the non-rationalizable aspects of emotions, i.e. whatever in them could not be subsumed under common notions. He therefore was left with the cognitive aspects of emotions, keeping outside of his report the inner feeling which accompanies them. Spinoza's psychology, I claim, disregards any non-cognitive aspect of emotions.
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DOI 10.1080/096087800360201
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Does Continuous Creation Entail Occasionalism?: Malebranche.Andrew Pessin - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):413-439.
Emotion, Feeling, and Passion in Kant.Ana Marta González - 2015 - Trans/Form/Ação 38 (3):75-98.
Spinoza on Emotion and Akrasia.Christiaan Remmelzwaal - 2016 - Dissertation, Université de Neuchatel

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