Computational epistemology and e-science: A new way of thinking [Book Review]

Minds and Machines 19 (4):557-567 (2009)
Abstract
Recent trends towards an e-Science offer us the opportunity to think about the specific epistemological changes created by computational empowerment in scientific practices. In fact, we can say that a computational epistemology exists that requires our attention. By ‘computational epistemology’ I mean the computational processes implied or required to achieve human knowledge. In that category we can include AI, supercomputers, expert systems, distributed computation, imaging technologies, virtual instruments, middleware, robotics, grids or databases. Although several authors talk about the extended mind and computational extensions of the human body, most of these proposals don’t analyze the deep epistemological implications of computer empowerment in scientific practices. At the same time, we must identify the principal concept for e-Science: Information . Why should we think about a new epistemology for e-Science? Because several processes exist around scientific information that require a good epistemological model to be understood.
Keywords e-Science  Epistemology  Computation  Extended mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11023-009-9168-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,982
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

E-Science and the Data Deluge.David Casacuberta & Jordi Vallverdú - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-15.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-11-21

Total downloads
48 ( #130,489 of 2,274,893 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #70,722 of 2,274,893 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature