Getting what you desire: the normative significance of genetic relatedness in parent–child relationships

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (3):487-495 (2019)

Authors
Guido Pennings
University of Ghent
Abstract
People who are involuntarily childless need to use assisted reproductive technologies if they want to have a genetically related child. Yet, from an ethical point of view it is unclear to what extent assistance to satisfy this specific desire should be warranted. We first show that the subjectively felt harm due to the inability to satisfy this reproductive desire does not in itself entail the normative conclusion that it has to be met. In response, we evaluate the alternative view according to which the satisfaction of this desire is regarded as a way to meet one’s presumed intermediate need for parenthood. This view presupposes that parenthood is one of those general categories of experiences and activities that contribute an irreplaceable value to people’s lives, but the central difficulty is to find those characteristics that mark out parenthood as an irreplaceable constituent of a valuable life. We go on to argue, however, that even if one assumes that parenthood is such an irreplaceable constituent that makes life more valuable, this does not necessarily entail a moral duty to satisfy the desire for genetic parenthood. We conclude that there is a pro tanto obligation to help people conceive a genetically related child, but that this can be outweighed by other moral considerations, such as safety and justice concerns.
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DOI 10.1007/s11019-019-09889-4
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References found in this work BETA

Preferring a Genetically-Related Child.Tina Rulli - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (6):669-698.
Family History.J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (3):357-378.

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