Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):57-76 (2010)

Re'em Segev
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Justificatory defenses apply to actions that are generally wrong and illegal—mainly since they harm people—when they are justified—usually since they prevent harm to others. A strict conception of justification limits justificatory defenses to actions that reflect all pertinent principles in the optimal manner. A more relaxed conception of justification applies to actions that do not reflect all pertinent principles optimally due to mistake but are not too far from this optimum. In the paper, I consider whether justificatory defenses should reflect the strict conception of justification or a more relaxed conception of justification. This question is important since often the relevant actions are not strictly justified, while the alternative of an excuse is frequently irrelevant or does not provide an appropriate solution. Reflection on this question raises the following dilemma: On the one hand, the strict interpretation seems too harsh, especially with regard to legal liability. On the other hand, it is difficult to explain the basis for a more relaxed conception of justification. I conclude, first, that justification—and accordingly wrongfulness—is a matter of degree and that the strictly justified action is merely the peak of a continuum, and, second, that a practical reaction is in place only with regard to actions whose wrongness is above a minimal threshold
Keywords Justification  Optimal justification  Sub-optimal justification  Justificatory defense  Uncertainty  Mistake  Excuse
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DOI 10.1007/s11572-009-9086-5
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
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Should Law Track Morality?Re'em Segev - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (2):205-223.

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