Epistemic issues in the free will debate: can we know when we are free?

Philosophical Studies 166 (2):363-380 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the views of Robert Kane on the one hand and John Fischer and Mark Ravizza on the other both lead to the following conclusion: we should have very low confidence in our ability to judge that someone is acting freely or in a way for which they can be held responsible. This in turn means, I claim, that these views, in practice, collapse into a sort of hard incompatibilist position, or the position of a free will denier. That would at least be an unintended consequence, and it might be regarded as a virtual reductio. Versions of the objection could likely be made against a number of other accounts of free will, but I will limit my focus to Kane and Fischer. Along the way, by way of response to some possible objections to my argument, I make some comments about epistemic closure principles
Keywords Free will  John Martin Fischer  Robert Kane  Epistemic closure  Skepticism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0044-z
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.

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The Argument From Moral Responsibility.John Maier - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-19.

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