Philosophy of Science 50 (3):398-412 (1983)

Teddy Seidenfeld
Carnegie Mellon University
For Savage (1954) as for de Finetti (1974), the existence of subjective (personal) probability is a consequence of the normative theory of preference. (De Finetti achieves the reduction of belief to desire with his generalized Dutch-Book argument for Previsions.) Both Savage and de Finetti rebel against legislating countable additivity for subjective probability. They require merely that probability be finitely additive. Simultaneously, they insist that their theories of preference are weak, accommodating all but self-defeating desires. In this paper we dispute these claims by showing that the following three cannot simultaneously hold: (i) Coherent belief is reducible to rational preference, i.e. the generalized Dutch-Book argument fixes standards of coherence. (ii) Finitely additive probability is coherent. (iii) Admissible preference structures may be free of consequences, i.e. they may lack prizes whose values are robust against all contingencies
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DOI 10.1086/289126
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References found in this work BETA

Coherence and the Axioms of Confirmation.Abner Shimony - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):1-28.
Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations.Leonard Savage - 1971 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 66 (336):783-801.
Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections, and Problems.H. Kyburg - 1978 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):157 - 180.

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Citations of this work BETA

Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 229--251.
Arguments for–or Against–Probabilism&Quest;: Articles.Alan Hájek - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.
Dutch Book Arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability.Jon Williamson - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.

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