Scylla and Charybdis of the epistemic relativist: Why the epistemic relativist still cannot use the sceptic's strategy

Authors
Markus Seidel
University of Münster
Abstract
In a reply to Howard Sankey I have maintained that the epistemic relativist cannot use the strategy of the sceptic since the relativist is at pains not to draw the sceptical solution. Sankey has objected to my argument by distinguishing between weak and strong justification: according to Sankey, the relativist using the sceptic’s strategy aims to provide an argument against the latter form of justification but still maintains that we can have the former.In this counter-response I argue that if this is really the relativist’s strategy then she cannot provide any argument against the absolutist at all. The reason is that she simply fails to address the key question in the debate about relative/absolute justification: are there any absolutely correct epistemic standards? The epistemic relativist using the sceptic’s strategy is thus trapped between the Scylla of undermining her right to maintain that there is relative justification and the Charybdis of providing no argument against absolutism at all
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.10.004
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.
Epistemic Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion.Howard Sankey - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):562-570.
Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion.Howard Sankey - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.

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