On the Universal Principle of Scientific and Philosophical Cognition

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:235-239 (2008)
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Abstract

The purpose of the present report is to draw the philosophical community’s attention to the universal principle of cognition, the principle of extrapolation, capable of integrating the present and possibly, the future methods of man’s cognitive attitude to the world. Extrapolation is interpreted as a key logical-and-gnosiological procedure and, depending on subject/object relationships, is subdivided into “actual” and “real”. According to the actual extrapolation principle in any kind of cognition, it is important to take account of the fact of the ontological presence of the individual in the world. The real extrapolation method is based on the available gnosiological content of a cognizing subject and on the use of a totality of the logical, gnosiological, epistemological, methodological, content-related and even psychological wealth of accumulated knowledge with the aim of its augmentation. The all-important aim of new gnosiology (theory of knowledge) should consist in studying permissible bounds of extrapolation, and in identifying basic laws of extrapolation of knowledge in two forms of its being as a necessary condition of their possible synthesis.

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