Common Ground in Non-face-to-face Communication: In Sensu Diviso or In Sensu Composito

Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (3):657-678 (2024)
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Abstract

Traditional definitions of common ground in terms of iterative de re attitudes do not apply to conversations where at least one conversational participant is not acquainted with the other(s). I propose and compare two potential refinements of traditional definitions based on Abelard’s distinction between generality in sensu composito and in sensu diviso.

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Merel Semeijn
Institut Jean Nicod

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References found in this work

A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5):701-721.

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