Empiricism in science and ethics

Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):449-470 (1993)

Abstract

We elucidate the conditions under which any hypothesis is explanatorily relevant by analyzing several tests of explanatory relevance and explanations based on those tests. A new causal criterion of explanatory relevance is developed and defended. We show how the causal criterion succeeds in establishing, at the very least, a very strong presumption against moral facts.

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Citations of this work

Moral Facts and the Problem of Justification in Ethics.Stefan Sencerz - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):368 – 388.

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