Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief

Synthese 94 (3):453 - 476 (1993)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete.

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Thomas Senor
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Citations of this work

Memory.Kourken Michaelian & John Sutton - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Memory as a generative epistemic source.Jennifer Lackey - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):636–658.
Knowing Without Evidence.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):309-331.

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References found in this work

Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Theory of knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

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