How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7 (2018)
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Andrew Sepielli
University of Toronto, Mississauga

References found in this work

Value in ethics and economics.Elizabeth Anderson - 1993 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.

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