Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2951-2968 (2016)

Authors
Andrew Sepielli
University of Toronto at Mississauga
Abstract
Sometimes it’s not certain which of several mutually exclusive moral views is correct. Like almost everyone, I think that there’s some sense in which what one should do depends on which of these theories is correct, plus the way the world is non-morally. But I also think there’s an important sense in which what one should do depends upon the probabilities of each of these views being correct. Call this second claim “moral uncertaintism”. In this paper, I want to address an argument against moral uncertaintism offered in the pages of this journal by Brian Weatherson, and seconded elsewhere by Brian Hedden, the crucial premises of which are: that acting on moral uncertaintist norms necessarily involves motivation by reasons or rightness as such, and that such motivation is bad. I will argue that and are false, and that at any rate, the quality of an agent’s motivation is not pertinent to the truth or falsity of moral uncertaintism in the way that Weatherson’s and Hedden’s arguments require.
Keywords Moral uncertainty  Fetishism  Moral motivation  Brian Weatherson  Brian Hedden  Michael Smith
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0645-z
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
The Moral Problem.James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.
Running Risks Morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.
Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.
The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning.Kenneth W. Kemp - 1988 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 24 (1):76-80.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Rational Moral Ignorance.Zach Barnett - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Moral Uncertainty.Krister Bykvist - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3):e12408.
The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.
One Thought Too Few: Where De Dicto Moral Motivation is Necessary.Ron Aboodi - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):223-237.
One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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