Equivalent explanations and mathematical realism. Reply to “Evidence, Explanation, and Enhanced Indispensability”

Synthese 193 (2):423-434 (2016)
Andrea Sereni
Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS Pavia
The author of “Evidence, Explanation, Enhanced Indispensability” advances a criticism to the Enhanced Indispensability Argument and the use of Inference to the Best Explanation in order to draw ontological conclusions from mathematical explanations in science. His argument relies on the availability of equivalent though competing explanations, and a pluralist stance on explanation. I discuss whether pluralism emerges as a stable position, and focus here on two main points: whether cases of equivalent explanations have been actually offered, and which ontological consequences should follow from these
Keywords Enhanced indispensability argument  Inference to the best explanation  Mathematical explanation  Mathematical realism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0491-5
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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