In Friedrich Stadler (ed.), Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence. Springer Verlag (2019)

Denis Seron
University of Liège
Brentano’s empiricism displays striking similarities with Mach’s phenomenalism. Both authors hold physical reality to be a “fiction” and reject the traditional view of truth and existence. In this paper, the author seeks to clarify some aspects of the Mach-Brentano debate, with a special focus on the theory of intentionality. First, he links this debate to an earlier one, namely to the debate about the mind-body relation. Secondly, he discusses some of Brentano’s objections and construes his intentionalism as an alternative to the psychophysical identity thesis.
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DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-04378-0_14
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