Ethics 117 (4):649-673 (2007)

Authors
Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
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DOI 10.1086/518954
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