Oxford University Press (2012)
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Abstract |
Can we have objective knowledge of right and wrong, of how we should live and what there is reason to do? Can it be anything but luck when our moral beliefs are true? Kieran Setiya confronts these questions in their most compelling and articulate forms, and argues that if there is objective ethical knowledge, human nature is its source.
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Reprint years | 2014 |
Buy this book | $44.11 new (21% off) Amazon page |
ISBN(s) | 0199657459 9780199657452 9780198709619 0198709617 |
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References found in this work BETA
Getting It Right By Accident.Masahiro Yamada - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):72-105.
Citations of this work BETA
Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:309-332.
Moral Disagreement and Moral Skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.
I—Culture and Critique.Sally Haslanger - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):149-173.
View all 58 citations / Add more citations
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