European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):129-157 (2011)

Authors
Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Argues for a causal-psychological account of acting for reasons. This view is distinguished from a more ambitious causal theory of action, clarified as far as possible, and motivated—against non-reductive, teleological, and behaviourist alternatives—on broadly metaphysical grounds
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00378.x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Intention.G. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
A Theory of Human Action.Alvin I. Goldman - 1970 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Group Action Without Group Minds.Kenneth Silver - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.
Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
The Instrumental Structure of Actions.Markos Valaris - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):64-83.

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