Reasons and Causes

European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):129-157 (2011)
Abstract
Argues for a causal-psychological account of acting for reasons. This view is distinguished from a more ambitious causal theory of action, clarified as far as possible, and motivated—against non-reductive, teleological, and behaviourist alternatives—on broadly metaphysical grounds
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00378.x
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References found in this work BETA
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.
The Instrumental Structure of Actions.Markos Valaris - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):64-83.
Setiya on Reasons and Causes.Ben Wolfson - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):276-289.

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