Transcendental idealism in the 'aesthetic'


Abstract
In the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant offers an argument for transcendental idealism. This argument is one focus of the longstanding controversy between "one-world" and "two-world" interpretations of the distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear. I present an interpretation of the argument of the "Aesthetic" that supports a novel "one-world" interpretation. On this interpretation, Kant is concerned with the mind-dependence of spatial and temporal properties; and with the idea that space and time can be identified with mental objects. I end by arguing that, for Kant, even on a "one-world" interpretation, we do not know the nature or even the existence of mind-independent things
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00326.x
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References found in this work BETA

Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.

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Imagination and Inner Intuition.Andrew Stephenson - 2017 - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Kant and the philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-123.
Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic.Lucy Allais - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):47-75.

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