In the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant offers an argument for transcendental idealism. This argument is one focus of the longstanding controversy between "one-world" and "two-world" interpretations of the distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear. I present an interpretation of the argument of the "Aesthetic" that supports a novel "one-world" interpretation. On this interpretation, Kant is concerned with the mind-dependence of spatial and temporal properties; and with the idea that space and time can be identified with mental objects. I end by arguing that, for Kant, even on a "one-world" interpretation, we do not know the nature or even the existence of mind-independent things
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00326.x
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References found in this work BETA

Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
Kant and the Claims of Knowledge.Paul Guyer - 1987 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Imagination and Inner Intuition.Andrew Stephenson - 2017 - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Kant and the philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-123.
Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic.Lucy Allais - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):47-75.

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