Religious Studies 33 (3):249-266 (1997)
AbstractMost contemporary philosophers who defend the compatibility of hell with the divine goodness do so by arguing that the damned freely choose hell. Thomas Talbott denies that such a choice is possible, on the grounds that God in his goodness would remove any 'ignorance, deception, or bondage to desire' which would motivate a person to choose eternal misery. My strategy is to turn the tables on Talbott and ask why God would not remove the motives we have for any sin whatsoever. I argue that two plausible answers to this question also show why God would not remove our motives for choosing hell
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Citations of this work
Eternally Separated Lovers: The Argument From Love.Nicole Hassoun - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):633-643.
Universalism and the Problem of Hell.Ioanna-Maria Patsalidou - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (11):808-820.
Love and Death.Helen Daly - 2018 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), Heaven and Philosophy. Lexington Books. pp. 137-52.
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