Thomas Kuhn criticized falsifiability because it characterized "the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts," and it cannot be generalized. In Kuhn's view, a delimitation criterion must refer to the functioning of normal science. Kuhn objects to Popper's entire theory and excludes any possibility of rational reconstruction of the development of science. Imre Lakatos said that if a theory is scientific or non-scientific, it can be determined independently of the facts.He proposed a modification of Popper's criterion, which he called "sophisticated (methodological) falsification". DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30572.82568
Keywords falsifiability
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Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Against Method.Paul Feyerabend - 1975 - London: New Left Books.
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.Mary Hesse - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (61):372-374.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. Quine - 1951 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.

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