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Abstract
According to the scientific "justificationist" method, knowledge consisted of proven sentences. Classical intellectuals (or "rationalists," in the narrow sense of the term) have accepted extremely varied - and powerful "proofs", through revelation, intellectual intuition, experience. These, with the help of logic, have allowed them to prove any kind of scientific statement. Classical empiricists accepted as axioms only a relatively small set of "factual propositions" that expressed "hard facts". The value of their truth has been established by experience and has been the empirical basis of science. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28722.25288
Keywords imre lakatos  justificationism
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Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.Mary Hesse - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (61):372-374.

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