A logical hole in the chinese room

Minds and Machines 19 (2):229-235 (2009)
Abstract
Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (CRA) has been the object of great interest in the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science since its initial presentation in ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’ in 1980. It is by no means an overstatement to assert that it has been a main focus of attention for philosophers and computer scientists of many stripes. It is then especially interesting to note that relatively little has been said about the detailed logic of the argument, whatever significance Searle intended CRA to have. The problem with the CRA is that it involves a very strong modal claim, the truth of which is both unproved and highly questionable. So it will be argued here that the CRA does not prove what it was intended to prove.
Keywords Chinese room  Computation  Mind  Artificial intelligence
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-009-9151-9
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References found in this work BETA
Minds, Brains and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
The Chinese Room Argument.David Cole - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Citations of this work BETA
A Logical Hole the Chinese Room Avoids.Donald Nute - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (3):431-433.

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2009-06-15

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