Analysis 74 (3):404-411 (2014)

Authors
Nicholas Shackel
Cardiff University
Abstract
A prevalent assumption is that normativity is a unity. In this paper I argue against this assumption by demonstrating the problems it poses to a well known answer to a well known problem for taking rationality to be normative. John Broome's normative requirement relation does indeed avoid that problem, but insofar as the relation is supposed to offer a general characterisation of the normativity of rationality, it fails. It fails because it cannot capture an important aspect of the normativity of rationality, that it is available to guide us. I show that if we distinguish two kinds of normativity it need not fail in this way
Keywords normativity  rationality  correctness  directivity
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anu063
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The Structure of Objects.Kathrin Koslicki - 2008 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Rationality.Nicholas Shackel - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):167-189.
Ought, Agents and Ambiguity That Matters.Joanna Klimczyk - 2017 - Studia Semiotyczne 31 (2):113-138.

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Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Is There Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Bootstrapping Normativity.Graham White - 2011 - Philosophy and Technology 24 (1):35-53.
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