Bayesianism, convergence and social epistemology

Episteme 5 (2):pp. 203-219 (2008)
Abstract
Following the standard practice in sociology, cultural anthropology and history, sociologists, historians of science and some philosophers of science define scientific communities as groups with shared beliefs, values and practices. In this paper it is argued that in real cases the beliefs of the members of such communities often vary significantly in important ways. This has rather dire implications for the convergence defense against the charge of the excessive subjectivity of subjective Bayesianism because that defense requires that communities of Bayesian inquirers share a significant set of modal beliefs. The important implication is then that given the actual variation in modal beliefs across individuals, either Bayesians cannot claim that actual theories have been objectively confirmed or they must accept that such theories have been confirmed relative only to epistemically insignificant communities
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.3366/E1742360008000324
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,820
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Probabilities Over Rich Languages, Testing and Randomness.Haim Gaifman & Marc Snir - 1982 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (3):495-548.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
47 ( #120,391 of 2,210,137 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #382,810 of 2,210,137 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature