Episteme 5 (2):pp. 203-219 (2008)
Following the standard practice in sociology, cultural anthropology and history, sociologists, historians of science and some philosophers of science define scientific communities as groups with shared beliefs, values and practices. In this paper it is argued that in real cases the beliefs of the members of such communities often vary significantly in important ways. This has rather dire implications for the convergence defense against the charge of the excessive subjectivity of subjective Bayesianism because that defense requires that communities of Bayesian inquirers share a significant set of modal beliefs. The important implication is then that given the actual variation in modal beliefs across individuals, either Bayesians cannot claim that actual theories have been objectively confirmed or they must accept that such theories have been confirmed relative only to epistemically insignificant communities
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References found in this work BETA
Probabilities Over Rich Languages, Testing and Randomness.Haim Gaifman & Marc Snir - 1982 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (3):495-548.
Citations of this work BETA
Evolved Cognitive Biases and the Epistemic Status of Scientific Beliefs.Helen de Cruz & Johan de Smedt - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):411-429.
Evolved Cognitive Biases and the Epistemic Status of Scientific Beliefs.Cruz Helen De & Smedt Johan De - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):411 - 429.
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