Constructing a Moorean ‘Open Question’ Argument: The Real Thought Move and the Real Objective

Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (3):463-88 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


How Moore’s open question argument works, insofar as it does, remains a matter of controversy. My purpose here is to construct an open question argument based on a novel interpretation of how Moore’s argument might work. In order to sidestep exegetical questions, I do not claim here to be offering Moore’s own argument. Rather, I offer a reconstruction making use of important elements of Moore’s methodology and assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint. The crucial role within the argument is played by what I call the real thought move. I show that the reconstructed argument is more defensible from some standard objections than the common construction. I finish by drawing attention to a neglected objective that would make sense within Moore’s viewpoint, showing that it fits with a major commitment of Bonjour’s moderate rationalism, and show how the package might be important for the non-naturalist today.



External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moore's "New" Open Question Argument.Peter A. Sutton - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):681-693.
In defence of the open question argument.Caj Strandberg - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):179-196.
What a Real Argument Is.Ben Hamby - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (3):313-326.
Lacan and the concept of the 'real'.Tom Eyers - 2012 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Empirical thought experiments: A trascendental-operational view.Buzzoni Marco - 2010 - Epistemologia. An Italian Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33:05-26.
Reality: a very short introduction.Jan Westerhoff - 2011 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Works of Art and Mere Real Things—Again.Ivan Gaskell - 2020 - British Journal of Aesthetics 60 (2):131-149.
Real.Jonathan Bennett - 1966 - Mind 75 (300):501-515.


Added to PP

627 (#28,027)

6 months
290 (#7,626)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nicholas Shackel
Cardiff University

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 22 references / Add more references