Consciousness and the first person

Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (12):57-91 (2007)
Authors
Itay Shani
Sun Yat Sen University, Zhuhai Campus
Abstract
According to John Searle's connection principle (CP) all intentional states are, necessarily, potentially conscious (Searle 1992). Thus formulated, CP implies that intentionality is ontologically dependent on consciousness. Searle's argument in favour of CP is based on the assumption that, while every intentional state is endowed with an aspectual shape, only conscious intentional states are intrinsically so endowed. In turn, the contention that only conscious intentional states are intrinsically aspectual and perspectival is based on what I call the Cartesian view of subjectivity (CS), according to which subjectivity implies consciousness. I argue that, though intuitive, CS is ultimately untenable. A plea is made for an alternative, `Aristotelian' view of subjectivity (AS), on which the roots of subjectivity lie not in consciousness per se, but in the more basic capacity for autonomous conduct. Searle's failure to appreciate this point, I argue, accounts for the unresolved dualistic tension over- shadowing his conception of mind.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,097
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Chinese Room Argument: Consciousness and Understanding.Simone Gozzano - 1997 - In Matjaz Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press. pp. 43--231.
Consciousness and Intentionality.John Barresi - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.
Searle's Unconscious Mind.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):123-148.
Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
What is the Connection Principle?Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):837-45.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
28 ( #244,923 of 2,313,468 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #549,066 of 2,313,468 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature