Behaviorism 2 (1):120-123 (1974)

Abstract
This paper is a rejoinder to a critique by richard hull in a previous issue. hull denied the legitimacy of moving from the thesis that there are certain one-to-one correlations between mental and physical properties to the thesis that the mental and physical are one and the same. i argue that the move can be justified if it is taken not as deductive but as inductive. given the right sort of correlations, it may be fruitful to conceive of the mental as identical with the physical
Keywords Body  Identity  Metaphysics  Minds  Ontology  Hull, R
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