Deflating logical consequence

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342 (2011)

Authors
Lionel Shapiro
University of Connecticut
Abstract
Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I then argue, against considerations put forward by Field and Beall, that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out deflationism about truth.
Keywords deflationism  logical consequence  entailment  Curry's paradox  validity Curry
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.678.x
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Two Flavors of Curry’s Paradox.Jc Beall & Julien Murzi - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
Logical Consequence and the Paradoxes.Edwin Mares & Francesco Paoli - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):439-469.
Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207.
There is No Paradox of Logical Validity.Roy T. Cook - 2014 - Logica Universalis 8 (3-4):447-467.

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