Defusing the Miners Paradox

Filosofiska Notiser 5:57-67 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper presents a case for the claim that the infamous miners paradox is not a paradox. This contention is based on some important observations about the nature of ignorance with respect to both disjunctions and conditional obligations and their modal features. The gist of the argument is that given the uncertainty about the location of the miners in the story and the nature of obligations, the apparent obligation to block either mine shaft is cancelled.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemicism, paradox, and conditional obligation.Ivan Hu - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2123-2139.
A Remark on Iffy Oughts.Malte Willer - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (7):449-461.
Conditional Obligation.Mark Ignat Vorobej - 1983 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
Chisholm's Paradox and Conditional Oughts.Catharine Saint Croix & Richmond Thomason - 2014 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8554:192-207.
A Note on Forrester’s Paradox.Clayton Peterson & Jean-Pierre Marquis - 2012 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):53-70.
The Unbearable Uncertainty Paradox.Sabine Roeser - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):640-653.
Two Flavors of Curry’s Paradox.Jc Beall & Julien Murzi - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
The Paradox of Knowability and Factivity.Michael Shaffer - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philiosophy 8 (1):85-91.
I Ought, Therefore I Can Obey.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-05-17

Downloads
677 (#24,871)

6 months
131 (#28,370)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Shaffer
Gustavus Adolphus College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.

View all 15 references / Add more references